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Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants of capital structure decisions by real estate firms, with 
a specific focus on the impact of political risk on leverage. Using a sample of Asia-Pacific 
REITs and listed property trusts, we find those firms with properties located in countries 
characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk, such as political instability, and/or 
greater uncertainty in the ability to repatriate and monetize profits from international investment 
activities, employ less debt than their counterparts operating in more politically stable 
environments. This core finding remains robust to alternative sample selection criteria 
including the division of the sample into high versus low market-to-book value firms, and also 
holds within the subset of organizations that are active in raising additional capital in the 
secondary markets. 
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Introduction 
The past two decades have seen an enormous expansion of international real estate 
investment opportunities, and unprecedented integration of related capital markets. These 
emerging trends present both unique opportunities and challenges for real estate firms 
investing across jurisdictional boundaries, and promise to significantly influence both the 
strategic positioning and operational characteristics of such firms. While early work along this 
dimension has focused on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of organizational 
design characteristics, the current investigation focuses on how political risk exposure 
influences a real estate firm’s ability to raise capital. Specifically, we argue REITs and listed 
property trusts facing enhanced levels of political risk exposure will face difficulties securing 
debt financing. As such, we posit these firms will be characterized by lower leverage, ceteris 
paribus. From an operational perspective, these systematic differences in firm leverage ratios 
are of key import to firm management as they may effectively constrain the investment 
opportunity set available to international real estate firms.1  
Two unique dimensions of the real estate market add substantively to the complexity of this 
decision-making process and further motivate the use of this industry as a compelling 
laboratory for examining political risk. First, despite the robustness of the aforementioned 
emerging trends, real estate remains both a highly segmented and localized market. For 
example, excess demand for apartments in China provides little, if any, value relevant 
information regarding the profitability of the office market in Australia. To date, real estate 
markets remain characterized by high degrees of both property type and geographic location 
specificity. Accordingly, political risk engendered by cross-border investing activities is 
becoming increasingly relevant with respect to investments in relatively illiquid, tangible assets 
such as commercial real estate properties. 
Second, the capital intensive nature of most real estate investment decisions adds an 
additional layer of complexity to this decision making process. Given the relatively stringent 
investment and payout regulations governing international REIT and listed property trust 
markets, as well as barriers to capital flows across national borders, many international real 
estate firms are effectively capital constrained (in the sense they have a limited ability to fund 
growth internally through retained profits) and must rely on external financing to undertake 
additional projects. As such, these firms are forced to borrow funds through either private or 
public channels, or incur the potentially significant negative signaling consequences 
associated with issuing equity capital. The purpose of the current investigation is to expand the 
literature on determinants of firm capital structure, international real estate markets, and the 
importance of location specific dimensions of portfolio risk on firm contracting decisions by 
investigating how political risk influences the capital structure of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed 
property trusts. Previewing our results, we find those firms with properties located in countries 
characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk do, in fact, employ less debt than their 
counterparts operating in more politically stable environments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Review of the Literature provides 
background information on the growth and development of Asia-Pacific real estate markets, 
while Determinants of Firm Capital Structure Decisions outlines the previously identified drivers 
of firm capital structure decisions for both real estate and non-real estate related entities. Data 
and Methodology describes the data and methodology used to investigate the relations 
between political risk and firm debt, while the results of our empirical investigation are provided 
and discussed in Analysis. Finally, Summary and Conclusions summarizes our key findings 
and concludes. 
Review of the Literature 
Growth in the Asia-Pacific Real Estate Market 
The evolution of the REIT industry in developed markets has established a solid framework for 
the quick adoption and effective deployment of similar investment structures throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region. However, there is a risk that these modern investment vehicles may 
outpace the attitudes of prevailing political paradigms in certain developing countries. In 
particular, the supreme laws that govern property rights in particular countries may lead to an 
irresolvable conflict between investors and the political authorities. For instance, the Chinese 
constitution dictates that all land in urban areas is owned by the State and all land in rural 
areas is owned collectively by the inhabitants of that area unless otherwise specified by law 
(Lou 2008). Such uncertainty regarding property rights and related concerns regarding the 
ability of institutions to effectively repatriate and monetize the gains from international real 
estate investing activities, represents a significant risk for Asia-Pacific real estate firms. 
Despite these concerns, REITs and listed property trusts across the Asia-Pacific arena 
continue to grow. Compared to the United States, where total REIT market capitalization has 
increased markedly from 10 billion U.S. dollars (USD) in 1990 to over 600 billion USD by 2012, 
the Asian REIT market has grown at an even higher rate. Specifically, Tan (2009) and Ernst 
and Young (2010) estimate this market has grown from only 2 billion USD in 2001 to 
approximately 68 billion USD by 2009, or nearly 2 ½ times faster than the U.S. based REIT 
market. 
Evidence suggesting this tremendous growth will continue across Asia-Pacific real estate 
markets is readily observable from an examination of demographic trends. Conventional 
wisdom posits that real estate development and population growth are positively correlated. As 
detailed in Neo (2005), Asia accounts for approximately half of the world’s population. 
Furthermore, the Asian region currently exhibits an increasing birth rate, while developed 
nations across the rest of the world generally exhibit flat or declining birth rates. Thus, from a 
global real estate investment perspective, the Asia-Pacific market seems well placed for 
continued growth. Interestingly, particularly given these birthrate dynamics, an estimated 50 % 
of the population in the four wealthiest regions in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong) will be over age 40, and hence of prime investment age. Additionally, the annual 
household savings of this demographic is substantial and estimated to reach approximately 
64,000 USD by 2020 (Neo 2005). Taken together, these figures strongly suggest the Asia-
Pacific REIT market is well positioned for continued growth for the foreseeable future. 
Strategic Responses to Geographic Dimensions of Portfolio/Political Risk 
Given both the rapid growth and evolving nature of this relatively young and highly regulated 
market segment, firms operating within this dynamic marketplace must be proactive and 
strategically position themselves to be ready and able to optimally capitalize on the 
opportunities and mitigate the threats presented by this unique operating environment. Along 
this dimension, a number of existing studies provide evidence that firms operating across 
international boundaries systematically alter their capital structure in direct response to the 
unique legal, regulatory, and operational risks engendered via international operations. For 
example, both Lee and Kwok (1988) and Fatemi (1988) find that contrary to conventional 
wisdom which posits large, internationally diversified corporations should exhibit reduced 
bankruptcy costs and thus an enhanced debt capacity, multinational companies (MNC) 
actually exhibit lower debt ratios than their smaller, purely domestic counterparts. Building 
upon this foundation, Burgman (1996) concludes political risk, exchange rate risk, and 
increased agency costs may all limit the debt capacity of multinational firms and help explain 
the observed relations. Similarly, Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) conclude multinationals use 
less debt, and argue this is driven by the increased agency costs associated with actively 
monitoring a more geographically diversified set of operations. Continuing, Chen et al. (1997) 
again document lower ratios for MNCs relative to their domestic counterparts, however, within 
the subset of multinational firms they find leverage is actually positively related to the degree of 
internationalization. Finally, and further complicating the discussion of international capital 
structure issues, Reed et al. (2001) conclude that despite the above mentioned agency cost 
and international risk dimensions, MNCs exhibit both higher credit ratings and a lower cost of 
debt than domestic companies. Taken together, these findings suggest there is broad 
agreement that international firms face unique complications which systematically influence 
their capital structure related decision making. 
While these findings indicate that simply operating in multiple countries may well impact a 
firm’s capital structure, they ignore important operational differences across countries. This 
suggests the need for a more detailed analysis of the drivers of the relation.2 More specifically, 
emerging empirical evidence suggests firms within the Asia-Pacific real estate market 
understand political risk, and alter their organizational structures as a result. For example, Sun 
(2010) develops a theoretical model explaining how real estate firms select their investment 
advisor. While conventional wisdom holds that internally advised investment companies enjoy 
reduced agency costs, Sun demonstrates that depending upon available contracting options 
and market conditions, externally advised firms may benefit from 1) reduced agency costs due 
to reputational capital effects, 2) enhanced monitoring of individual property managers, 
portfolio advisers, and other related professionals, or 3) efficiency gains. Thus, to the extent 
political risk influences agency costs, monitoring capabilities, or the ability to realize gains from 
such activities, political risk could influence the firm’s optimal organizational design. Consistent 
with this notion, Cashman et al. (2013) also examine the strategic underpinnings of the advisor 
choice decision. They conclude that the choice between internal and external advisement for 
Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts represents a strategic trade-off between the 
agency costs associated with external advisement and the potential benefits associated with 
capturing location specific soft information. Furthermore, as the opacity of soft information is 
likely related to observable dimensions of political risk, the authors conclude the optimal 
selection of internal versus external advisement, and hence organizational form, is inherently 
linked to political risk.3 Taken together, the results presented in these papers strongly suggest 
a firm’s choice of organizational form may well represent a value relevant, strategic decision, 
driven by the business environment the real estate firm confronts. 
Extending this paradigm, the current investigation examines an additional, potentially more 
significant choice for real estate firms—the capital structure decision. Specifically, we posit that 
political risk exposure resulting from a real estate firm’s investments across jurisdictions 
influences the firm’s capital structure decision. Firms must balance the increased costs 
associated with higher political risk exposure, including the likelihood of not being able to meet 
their debt obligations and the resistance of lenders to provide additional financing on favorable 
terms, against the higher returns offered by higher leverage and greater risk exposure. As 
such, we hypothesize that Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts with investment 
property holdings concentrated in countries characterized by high levels of political risk will be 
forced to strategically lower their debt ratios. Once again, such limitations effectively serve as 
potential constraints upon management’s menu of available investment project options. 
Determinants of Firm Capital Structure Decisions 
Traditional Determinants of Firm Capital Structure 
Over the past 50 years, three primary theories governing firm leverage and security issuance 
decisions have become widely known and embraced throughout the general finance literature. 
First, trade-off theory posits that a firm’s optimal capital structure is found by comparing the tax 
benefits accruing from the use of debt against the potential increase in deadweight bankruptcy 
costs associated with such actions.4 While widely accepted as a primary driver of capital 
structure decisions for non-REIT firms, the relatively unique regulatory nature of real estate 
investment trust markets around the world impose significant barriers to applying trade-off 
theory to the real estate market. For example, one of the primary benefits of the REIT 
organizational form is the ability to avoid, or at least reduce, taxes at the corporate/entity level. 
Across the Asia-Pacific region, virtually every market offers non-trivial tax benefits to REITs in 
exchange for compliance with regulatory conventions, such as substantial distribution (90 % or 
more of taxable income) requirements.5 Given the ability of these firms to reduce, or avoid 
entity level taxation, trade-off theory appears to offer little insight into why REITs would choose 
to employ relatively high levels of debt.6  
Second, the pecking-order theory articulated by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
posits that capital needy firms attempting to maximize long-run shareholder wealth will prefer 
to issue equity when it is overvalued, while relying on debt financing when market values of 
equity do not fully reflect intrinsic values. Sophisticated investors, cognizant of both their 
information deficit regarding the firm’s intrinsic value and the aforementioned incentives for 
firms to issue overvalued equity, are likely to discount offering bids for seasoned equity 
issuances. As a result, firms with robust but informationally opaque operations and profit 
expectations may strategically choose to avoid the potential negative signaling consequences 
associated with equity issuance and disproportionately rely on debt financing. 
Han (2006) suggests these signaling concerns may be particularly important for REITs, as 
their assets are uniquely difficult to value. Specifically, given the highly segmented and 
localized nature of commercial property markets, analysts must not only understand the nature 
of the cash flows accruing to such investments, but must also be keenly aware of the 
complications arising from holding illiquid assets subject to complex, opaque contracts and 
regulations. Consistent with this notion, U.S. REITs have consistently been found to exhibit 
higher debt ratios than their non-REIT counterparts.7  
On the other hand, a number of compelling arguments also limit the applicability of pecking-
order theory within real estate markets. For example, the aforementioned payout requirements 
may severely hamper the ability of Asia-Pacific REITs to fund expansion activities via internally 
generated profits. As a result, these firms may not have the same financing options as their 
non-REIT counterparts. Empirical evidence supporting this contention is provided by Brown 
and Riddiough (2003) and Ott et al. (2005) who both conclude REITs finance their long-run 
development and investment activities by issuing debt and/or equity rather than relying on 
retained earnings.8 Given the implicit capital constraints REITs operate under, they are 
effectively pushed into the market more frequently than their non-REIT counterparts. As a 
result, the market may well be more familiar with a typical REIT’s operational strategy, thereby 
mitigating the negative signal generally associated with an equity issuance for a non-REIT firm. 
Third, market-timing theory suggests firm security issuance decisions will be made strategically 
by company insiders in an attempt to maximize value for their existing shareholders. As with 
the pecking-order theory, security issuers are believed to rely upon debt financing when equity 
is undervalued in the marketplace, while conversely choosing to disproportionately issue equity 
when share prices are overvalued. Market-timing advocates believe that for informationally 
opaque firms, deviations between market prices and intrinsic values are often sufficiently large 
that informed insiders can effectively expropriate wealth from new investors to existing 
shareholders.9  
Within the real estate literature, the market-timing theory of capital structure decisions has 
been investigated by at least three recent studies. Interestingly, the results of these studies are 
somewhat difficult to reconcile. First, Feng et al. (2007) document a positive, rather than 
negative, relation between lagged market-to-book ratios and current firm leverage. This result 
is clearly at odds with the predictions of market-timing advocates. On the other hand, both 
Boudry et al. (2010) and Harrison et al. (2011) find strong support for the market-timing theory 
within their investigations of REIT security issuance decisions and aggregate debt levels, 
respectively. Thus, we view the relevance of market timing for capital structure decisions within 
real estate markets as an open empirical question. 
Given the theoretical limitations of applying both trade-off theory and pecking-order theory to 
real estate markets, as well as the mixed results from previous market-timing investigations, 
ongoing empirical investigations of real estate company capital structure choices and security 
issuance decisions are forced to rely upon a variety of firm level operating characteristics as 
explanatory variables. Based upon the existing literature, four attributes have consistently 
emerged as robust predictors of firm leverage: 1) asset tangibility, 2) firm size, 3) profitability, 
and 4) growth options. We next describe the motivation and previous empirical evidence 
supporting the inclusion of each of these traditional determinants of firm capital structure 
choices. 
Determinants of Firm Level Leverage Decisions 
Asset Tangibility 
A wealth of both theoretical and empirical investigations of non-REIT firm capital structure 
decisions document a positive relation between the tangibility of a firm’s assets and the 
organization’s debt capacity. Conceptually, real assets are generally viewed as providing more 
effective collateral. Support for this paradigm can be found in numerous investigations 
including, but not limited to, Myers (1977, 1984), Williamson (1988), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Jaffe (1991), Pulvino (1998), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Barclay et al. (2006), and Brown and Marble (2009). As such, throughout our empirical 
analysis we control for the tangible nature of each firm’s assets using the ratio of total real 
estate operations to total assets for each firm. Ex-ante, we expect a positive relation between 
asset tangibility and firm leverage ratios. 
Firm Size 
Within the context of trade-off theory, Rajan and Zingales (1995) proffer that increasing firm 
size should be associated with enhanced firm stability, thus decreasing bankruptcy costs. This 
suggests larger firms should have a higher debt capacity. Similarly, Brown and Riddiough 
(2003) argue that larger firms’ securities are both more stable and more liquid than those 
offered by smaller firms. These characteristics also suggest a positive relation between firm 
size and leverage.10  
On the other hand, to the extent larger firms are more informationally transparent, pecking-
order theory would suggest the negative signaling consequences of seasoned equity offers 
would be substantively lower for larger firms. Thus, we might rationally observe a negative 
relation between firm size and leverage. To capture the effect of firm size on leverage, we 
include the natural log of each firm’s total assets as a control variable across all model 
specifications. 
Profitability 
As with firm size, increased firm profitability may influence firm leverage through multiple 
channels depending upon which capital structure theory dominates. Under trade-off theory, 
enhanced profitability should reduce the probability of financial distress, lowering expected 
bankruptcy costs, thus suggesting a higher debt capacity (and level) for more profitable firms. 
Conversely, Rajan and Zingales (1995) posit that managers have a self-interested desire to 
avoid the disciplining effects of substantive debt service requirements. As increasing 
profitability should afford managers more flexibility and trust with senior management, more 
profitable firms may well choose relatively lower debt levels.11  
Finally, we also note that Baker and Wurgler (2002) contend the observed relations between 
firm profitability and leverage are driven, in large part, by retained earnings. Given the limited 
ability of REITs and listed property trusts to retain large amounts of profits, it is entirely 
plausible that previously observed empirical relations between firm profitability and leverage 
amongst non-REIT firms will be very weak, or non-existent, within real estate markets. 
Growth Options 
A number of empirical investigations also document a consistently negative relation between a 
firm’s growth opportunities and leverage ratios. These studies include Myers (1984), Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Fama and French (2002), and Barclay et 
al. (2006). Conceptual justification for such a relation dates to at least Myers (1977) who 
argues high debt burdens create a potential debt overhang problem for corporate borrowers in 
which firms rationally forgo positive NPV projects because the gains from undertaking such 
investments accrue exclusively to debtholders. To avoid such perverse incentives, high-growth 
firms may proactively scale back their use of financial leverage, thus inducing an observed 
negative relation between firm leverage and growth opportunities.12  
Real Estate Industry and REIT Specific Determinants of Firm Debt 
While the four previously enumerated attributes have consistently been found to influence non-
REIT capital structure decisions, additional determinants of capital structure decisions tend to 
be industry and/or firm specific. For example, a number of investigations focusing directly on 
the real estate market suggest a variety of additional attributes that may be significant in 
explaining leverage decisions within this industry. 
First, as noted by both Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Brown and Marble (2009), the liability 
structure of a firm’s debt may influence their debt capacity. Interestingly, Brown and Riddiough 
argue an increased level of secured debt within a firm’s capital structure is associated with an 
increased probability of issuing equity, and hence secured debt is inversely related to firm 
leverage. They further contend this relation is driven by the increased agency costs associated 
with managing multiple classes of assets. Conversely, Brown and Marble (2009) develop and 
test a theoretical model of secured debt usage and conclude secured debt increases a firm’s 
debt capacity through its role in mitigating potential asset substitution problems. To the extent 
collateralized debt deters firms from increasing the variance of their assets in place, risk 
averse lenders will be more willing to provide additional debt financing. 
Second, in a similar vein, Boudry et al. (2010) argue firms with greater access to public debt 
markets should exhibit an enhanced debt capacity.13 Specifically, they argue firms with rated 
debt already outstanding are likely characterized by relatively transparent assets and/or low 
transaction costs associated with raising debt. Both alternatives suggest firms with outstanding 
rated debt should be more readily able to raise additional debt on favorable terms. Third, 
continuing along the asset transparency dimension, firms with split bond ratings are likely 
informationally opaque, while older firms are likely informationally transparent.14 As such, we 
expect firms with split bond ratings to be characterized by lower debt ratios, while older firms 
may well enjoy an enhanced debt capacity. 
Fourth, turning to alternative financing mechanisms, Harrison et al. (2011) conclude firms 
actively repurchasing their own shares on the open market, by construction, will increase their 
debt ratios. Additionally, such activities, within the context of pecking-order theory, should 
provide a positive signal to the market about the firm’s long-run prospects, thus further 
enhancing the firm’s debt capacity. Similarly, the authors also argue that both operating 
leverage and the use of long-term capital leases effectively serve as substitute sources of 
financial leverage. Therefore, firms characterized by high degrees of operating leverage and/or 
extensive lease obligations should exhibit reduced leverage ratios using traditional accounting 
based metrics. 
Fifth, turning to regulatory and accounting transparency, Hartzell et al. (2008) demonstrate that 
alternative regulatory considerations across jurisdictions can significantly impact firm level 
decision making. As such, after controlling for firm size, we expect the enhanced regulatory 
uncertainty associated with increasing the number of countries in which a firm owns 
investment properties may impair the firm’s ability to attract credit and thus lower debt ratios. 
Lastly, real assets associated with development activities may well be more tangible and 
transparent than the lease contracts associated with managing real properties. As such, we 
include a zero/one indicator variable identifying those firms actively participating in the 
development of real property as opposed to generating revenue exclusively from operating 
and/or managing existing facilities. Ex-ante, we expect real estate development firms to exhibit 
an enhanced debt capacity. 
Political Risk and Firm Leverage 
As the central focus of the current investigation, we posit that political risk and uncertainty 
materially influence firm capital structure decision making for real estate firms within the Asia-
Pacific region. This hypothesis is entirely consistent with the aforementioned findings of Fatemi 
(1988); Lee and Kwok (1988); Burgman (1996); Chen et al. (1997); and Doukas and Pantzalis 
(2003) on non-real estate firms. Within the context of Asia-Pacific real estate markets, we 
argue that REITs and listed property trusts holding investment properties located in countries 
with greater political risk or uncertainty will employ less leverage. Specifically, we contend this 
observed reduction in firm borrowing will be due (in part) to an increased probability that these 
firms will be unable to meet their debt service obligations. Furthermore, lenders rationally 
responding to such increased risk exposure, would thus be expected to ration credit, thereby 
reducing observable firm debt ratios.15  
Political risk exposure can take a variety of forms, and hence, we include three alternative 
metrics to assess the importance and robustness of the relation between political risk and firm 
capital structure. First, enhanced political turmoil in countries associated with inefficient 
governmental operations and/or poor election processes can increase the uncertainty of the 
business and economic environment of a jurisdiction. This will increase the risk of projects 
within the jurisdiction, and as a result increases the likelihood that the firm will be unable to 
meet its debt service obligations. Additionally, we expect lenders to be more reluctant to 
extend credit (on favorable terms) to real estate firms with properties located in countries 
characterized by greater risk or uncertainty with respect to the efficacy of governmental 
operations. 
Second, separate and distinct from the concept of political efficiency is the concept of political 
stability. More stable regimes allow for more effective forecasting and strategic planning on the 
part of organizations. Therefore, in jurisdictions characterized by enhanced political instability, 
we expect the firm’s forecasted cash flows will be less accurate, limiting that firm’s willingness 
and ability to fully commit expected cash flows to service the debt. Similarly, we also expect 
lenders will be less likely to extend credit on favorable terms when forecasted cash flows are 
less reliable. As such, increased political instability should be associated with reductions in 
observable firm debt ratios. 
Finally, when making international real estate investments, firms are concerned not only with 
the potential profitability of the proposed project, but also the ease with which the profits 
generated by the investment may be repatriated to the firm’s home country. Once again, we 
hypothesize that greater difficulty in extracting cash flows and profits from a given jurisdiction 
increases the riskiness of the proposed investment project making it more difficult for a firm to 
service its debt and reducing the willingness of lenders to extend credit. Once again, this 
presumption leads us to expect political risk will be inversely related to a firm’s use of leverage. 
Data and Methodology 
We begin our empirical analysis by identifying all REITs and listed property trusts tracked by 
SNL Financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, New Zealand Exchange Limited, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock 
Exchange over the period 2000 through 2011. Table 1 presents the breakdown of these firms 
based upon the country in which they are headquartered, and provides similar tabulations 
based upon the geographic location of the individual properties owned by sample firms. In 
total, our 187 sample firms hold ownership interests in over 8,000 individual properties. 
Examining these distributions, we note that while relatively few sample firms are 
headquartered in China (6 out of 187, or 3.2 %), Asia-Pacific real estate companies own 
numerous properties (1,295; or 16.1 % of sample holdings) there. Japan is similarly over-
represented in terms of the ratio of property holdings to firm headquarter locations (31.1 % vs. 
19.3 %), while conversely, Singapore serves as the home base for a disproportionately large 
(42, or 22.5 %) number of companies given the relatively small number of investment 
properties (675, or 8.4 %) owned by sample firms which are located there. 
Table 1 Firm and property location breakdown 
Country # of R.E. firms % of total # of properties % of total 
Australia 28 15.0 % 1,599 19.8 % 
China 6 3.2 % 1,295 16.1 % 
Country # of R.E. firms % of total # of properties % of total 
Hong Kong 47 25.1 % 977 12.1 % 
Japan 36 19.3 % 2,505 31.1 % 
Singapore 42 22.5 % 675 8.4 % 
Other 28 15.0 % 1,016 12.6 % 
Total 187 100.0 % 8,067 100.0 % 
This table provides a breakdown of the headquarter locations of the real estate firms in our sample, as well as the 
geographic location distribution of all properties owned by sample firms 
Political Risk Variables 
We next use the geographic location of each individual investment property held by every 
sample firm to count the number of properties located in each country, and then calculate the 
percentage of each firm’s property holdings located in each country. We then use the resulting 
weights to calculate each firm’s property weighted average Political Rights (Efficiency) Index, 
Political Change (Stability) Index, and R-Factor (Repatriation Index).16 These three measures 
capture various aspects of political risk including: how well the political process functions, how 
political changes will affect the firm’s ability to conduct business, and the firm’s ability to 
transfer profits out of the country. 
To further clarify each of these metrics, the Political Rights Index (Political) is provided by 
Freedom of the World, and is based on surveys regarding: the electoral process, political 
pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Higher Political scores represent a lower 
functioning government. As such, we anticipate a negative relation between Political and firm 
leverage. The Political Change Index and the R-Factor are both provided by Business Risk 
Service. The Political Change Index (PCI) is a measure of how political changes in the country 
will affect business operations, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years. 
Higher PCI scores represent a lower probability of political change and suggest that if political 
change does occur it is less likely to significantly impact the business environment. As such, 
we expect a positive relation between PCI and firm leverage. Lastly, the R-Factor, which 
stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of each country’s ability 
and willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits. Higher R-Factor 
values imply it is easier to repatriate profits back to the home country of the REIT or listed 
property trust. Again, given our hypothesis, we expect a positive relation between R-Factor 
and firm leverage. 
Business & Social Similarity Measures 
While our primary focus is on the political risk associated with investing across international 
borders, we recognize the need to control for the similarity between the social and economic 
operating environments of each firm’s home country (headquarters) location and those 
associated with the geographic location of their individual asset (property) holdings. Toward 
that end, we include six additional control metrics. Our first three metrics, the minimum time (in 
days) required to complete an export transaction, the minimum number of procedures required 
to register a property, and the ratio of the domestic equity market capitalization to GDP are all 
designed to capture the level of financial market development and business friendliness of the 
regulatory environment. Our last three metrics, the number of broadband subscribers (per 100 
people), the percentage of GDP which is spent on primary school education, and the female 
participation rate in the labor force are all designed to capture alternative dimensions of the 
social and cultural landscape faced by sample firms. 
In operationalizing these metrics, we take the absolute value of the difference between the 
headquarters country value and the property country value, respectively. We then weight the 
difference by the number of properties located in each country to form a measure of similarity 
between the countries in which the firm invests and the country in which it is headquartered. All 
else equal, we expect differences across countries in these similarity metrics to manifest 
themselves in the form of increased risk and uncertainty with respect to optimal operating 
practices and customs, and thus be associated with a reduced debt capacity. 
Financial/Regulatory Environment 
To help ensure our model is truly capturing political risk and not simply identifying spurious 
relations driven by the unique financial and/or regulatory environment faced by each firm, a 
number of additional controls are also included throughout our model specifications. First, 
following La Porta et al. (2004) we include a variable identifying the fraction of each firm’s 
investment portfolio located in countries whose legal systems are based upon the foundational 
tenets of (French and Roman) Civil Law as opposed to (British) Common Law. While La Porta 
et al. (2004) conclude common law is generally more efficient in securing and enforcing 
property rights, real estate companies investing across multiple international jurisdictions may 
well prefer the enhanced certainty associated with Civil Law based systems, which tend to rely 
more explicitly on the written text of the rules, laws, and regulations as opposed to location 
specific customs which may well enhance property rights but be relatively opaque and difficult 
for outside (i.e., non-local) investors to fully comprehend. As such, we leave the expected sign 
of our legal foundations metric as an open empirical question. 
Second, to account for potential variation across jurisdictions in the flexibility and openness of 
each firm’s operating environment, we employ the Heritage Foundation’s Business Freedom 
Index (BFI). Once again, for firms holding investment assets exclusively within a single 
country, the BFI exclusively represents the index value for that country. For firms investing 
across multiple jurisdictions, we weight each country value by the fraction of the firm’s 
investment properties located in that country to derive the property weighted average BFI for 
each firm. All else equal, we expect firms operating in less economically restrictive 
environments to enjoy enhanced economic opportunities, and thus exhibit an increased debt 
capacity.17  
Third, in many nations across the globe, the local economic system is dominated by the 
banking industry. Without broadly accessible, well-functioning equity markets, firms in such 
countries may be forced to disproportionately rely on debt financing as the primary source of 
new capital infusions into the firm.18 As such, we create a binary, indicator variable identifying 
whether the country in which each firm is headquartered has an economic system which is 
bank dominated or market dominated.19 Ex-ante, we expect firms with property holdings 
concentrated in bank dominated countries to be characterized by higher leverage ratios. 
Fourth, as borrowing may become relatively more attractive as interest rates decline, we 
include the 10-year, constant maturity U.S. Treasury rate as a proxy for world-wide interest 
rates. Fifth, as interest expenses on debt are generally deductible for federal income tax 
purposes, while dividend payments to shareholders are not, we also include the corporate tax 
rate corresponding to the country of incorporation for each firm.20 While in most industries 
higher marginal tax rates would portend higher debt levels, given the tax advantaged nature of 
most firms within our sample, we do not anticipate strong results along this dimension. 
Sixth and finally, given the international context of the current investigation, we recognize that 
firms reporting their financial statements following generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) may well be differentially difficult to value relative to their counterparts in the market 
choosing to report their financial statements following the principle based international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS). As such, we explicitly control for firm’s choice of primary 
accounting convention throughout our empirical specifications. 
REIT Specific Attributes 
We also construct various controls which have been shown to be correlated with real estate 
firm capital structure decisions. These variables were conceptually motivated above, and the 
accounting/financial data used to construct each of these metrics was obtained directly from 




Table 2 presents descriptive statistics regarding each of the variables employed throughout 
our empirical analysis. Examining the results in Table 2, we find the typical REIT within our 
sample finances approximately 30 % (book value) to 40 % (market value) of its assets in place 
using borrowed money. These leverage figures, while substantive, are approximately 10 
percentage points lower than those found for U.S. based real estate investment trusts. Relative 
to American firms, Asia-Pacific REITs also appear to be substantively larger, with Total Assets 
averaging over $3.7 billion for sample firms. This figure, which is roughly twice the size we 
would expect from a sample of U.S. based REITs, exhibits considerable variation around this 
mean value, and is driven upward by a handful of very large Hong Kong based REITs, 
including Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited. Median values along this dimension, while 
unreported, are much more in line with U.S. based firms at approximately $700 million. Further 
examination of the data in Table 2 reveals the typical firm recognizes a return on assets of 
approximately 4.6 % annually. Roughly half of all outstanding Asia-Pacific REIT debt is 
secured, while approximately 30 % of sample firms have rated debt outstanding. Finally, from 
a regulatory and financial reporting risk perspective, the average real estate firm in our sample 
owns investment properties in slightly more than two countries, with sample firms exhibiting a 
small proclivity toward following IFRS (61.1 %) as opposed to GAAP (38.9 %) accounting 
conventions. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable 
  Market leverage 1,066 0.393 0.201 0 0.990 
  Book leverage 1,066 0.315 0.142 0 0.796 
Political risk variables 
  Political rights index 1,066 0.032 0.022 0 0.070 
  Political change index 1,066 0.556 0.117 0.228 0.760 
  R-Factor 1,066 0.693 0.197 0.323 0.970 
Business similarity measures 
  Time to export 1,066 9.275 4.516 5 23.333 
  Procedures required to register property 1,066 5.155 0.635 2 6 
  Market cap / GDP 1,066 199.160 142.614 11.968 415.897 
Social/cultural similarity measures 
  Broadband per 100 1,066 14.701 6.194 0.237 21.657 
  % of GDP spent on primary education 1,066 15.370 4.008 11.141 22.082 
  Female participation in labor force 1,066 59.850 8.707 35.664 78.782 
Financial/regulatory characteristics 
  Legal origin 1,066 0.028 0.015 0 0.060 
  Business freedom 1,066 0.784 0.169 0.363 1 
  Bank dominated 1,066 0.337 0.473 0 1 
  US 10-year rate 1,066 0.038 0.007 0.028 0.050 
  Tax rate 1,066 0.135 0.133 0 0.407 
  GAAP 1,066 0.389 0.488 0 1 
General firm characteristics 
  Asset tangibility 1,066 0.149 0.165 0.001 1.760 
  Total assets 1,066 3,728,981 6,545,665 458 53,082,180 
  Profitability 1,066 0.046 0.075 −0.917 0.486 
  Growth options 1,066 0.836 0.579 0.027 5.575 
  Lagged leverage 1,066 0.385 0.205 0 0.985 
REIT specific attributes 
  Secured debt 1,066 48.402 42.016 0 100 
  Rated debt 1,066 0.311 0.463 0 1 
  Split bond ratings 1,066 0.058 0.234 0 1 
  Asset age 1,066 4.243 2.437 1 10 
  Repurchases 1,066 0.012 0.110 0 1 
  Operating leverage 1,066 1.482 2.804 −4 8 
  Lease payments 1,066 0.0004 0.002 0 0.028 
  Total countries 1,066 2.158 2.199 1 13 
  Development 1,066 0.580 0.494 0 1 
This table provides basic descriptive statistics (sample size, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) 
for the variables considered in the analysis. Political Rights Index is based on surveys regarding the electoral 
process, political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Political Change Index is a measure of how 
political changes in the country will affect business, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years. 
The R-Factor, which stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of a country’s ability 
and willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits. The remaining variables are defined 
in the appendix. We note that the reported similarity measures are based are raw numbers, and are not 
differenced as in our multivariate analysis 
Continuing, Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between each pair of our political risk 
measures. Not surprisingly, we find that political rights, political change, and R-Factor are all 
significantly correlated. The negative correlation between political change and political rights is 
a result of how the indices are constructed. A country with low political risk will have a high 
political change score while a country with a better functioning political system will have a 
lower political rights score. This difference in ordering is responsible for the negative 
correlations. The R-Factor is only significantly correlated with political rights, and contrary to 
the other indices suggests it is more difficult to repatriate profits from countries with well-
functioning political systems. While we find statistically significant relations between our 
political risk proxies, the magnitude of these relations is relatively low. This is not entirely 
unexpected, as we view each proxy as capturing a different dimension of political risk. 
Table 3 Political risk correlation matrix 
  Political rights Political risk R-Factor 
Political rights 1     
–     
Political change −0.2605a  1   
(0.00) –   
R-Factor 0.2088a  −0.0288 1 
(0.00) (0.35) – 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients associated with the three measures of political risk 
employed throughout this investigation. Political Rights Index is based on surveys regarding the electoral process, 
political pluralism, and the functioning of the government. Political Change Index is a measure of how political 
changes in the country will affect business, and the likelihood of change happening in the next 10 years. The R-
Factor, which stands for remittances and repatriation of capital factor, is a measure of a country’s ability and 
willingness to allow private foreign companies to repatriate their profits 
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
Univariate Analysis 
We next continue our analysis by comparing the amount of leverage used by firms with 
relatively high versus low political risk exposure. Each year we rank firms into terciles based 
upon their relative political risk exposure. More specifically, tercile rankings are constructed for 
each of our three political risk measures. We then compare the mean leverage levels between 
the firms in the low political risk tercile to those in the high political risk tercile. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 4. As expected, regardless of how political risk is 
measured, firms with more exposure to political risk utilize less leverage. 
  
Table 4 Univariate analysis 
Variable Low risk exposure High risk exposure Satterthwaite 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean T-test of differences 
Political rights 
  Market lev 392 0.451 364 0.347 7.20a  
  Book lev 392 0.380 364 0.246 14.56a  
Political change 
  Market lev 344 0.365 352 0.336 2.00b  
  Book lev 344 0.303 352 0.248 5.46a  
R-Factor 
  Market lev 364 0.444 365 0.363 5.51a  
  Book lev 364 0.369 365 0.303 6.13a  
This table provides mean values and univariate tests of differences in means for our leverage measures 
disaggregated by the firm’s relative political risk exposure. High Risk Exposure firms are those in the upper tercile 
of Political Rights Index values, and the lowest tercile of both Political Change and R-Factor Indices, respectively 
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level 
Multivariate Analysis 
Next, we continue on to our multivariate examination of how political risk exposure influences 
the capital structure of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts. Specifically, we examine a 
firm’s use of leverage with the following general form regression: 
Leverage=f(PoliticalRisk,Business&CulturalSimilarity,Financial/RegulatoryCharacteristics,Gene
ralFirmCharacteristics,REITSpecificAttributes,ϵ). 
The results from these base case regressions are presented in Table 5. More explicitly, the 
regressions are designed to examine our hypothesis that political risk exposure is inversely 
related to leverage, as 1) the uncertainty associated with higher levels of political risk 
increases the bankruptcy costs associated with debt, and 2) the increased uncertainty makes 
debt financing more difficult, or expensive, to obtain. The results presented in Table 5 are 
entirely consistent with our expectations, as market leverage tends to increase as political risk 
decreases.21 In Model 1, we observe that when REITs invest in countries with better 
functioning political systems, leverage increases. Continuing, Model 2 presents evidence that 
as the perceived likelihood and potential impact of political change decreases, REITs take on 
more leverage. Similarly, Model 3 demonstrates that as profits are more easily repatriated 
back to the home country of the REIT, allowing them to more easily repay their domestic 
lenders, the more leverage the REIT is able to carry. Lastly, consistent with Models 1 and 3, 
our fully specified Model 4 results suggest that REITs employ more leverage when they invest 
in countries with better functioning political systems and when they can more easily repatriate 
profits. 
Table 5 Determinants of market leverage for Asia-Pacific real estate companies 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Intercept 0.290a (4.50) 0.261a (4.00) 0.341a (5.26) 0.362a (5.87) 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Political risk variables 
  Political rights index −2.409a 
(−3.13) 
    −3.864a 
(−3.83) 
  Political change index   0.165a (2.78)   −0.056 (−0.70) 
  R-Factor     0.116a (2.89) 0.180a (4.68) 
Business similarity measures 








  Procedures required to register 
property 
0.064 (1.07) 0.073 (1.32) 0.094 (1.42) 0.042 (0.64) 
Market cap / GDP 0.000 (1.44) 0.000 (0.57) 0.000 (0.76) 0.001b (1.72) 
Social/cultural similarity measures 
  Broadband per 100 people 0.003 (0.20) 0.010 (0.79) 0.002 (−0.18) −0.002 (−0.15) 
  % of GDP spent on primary education −0.001 (−0.11) 0.005 (0.64) −0.003 (−0.36) −0.010 (−1.18) 
  Female participation in labor force 0.012b (1.84) 0.010b (1.74) 0.013c (2.01) 0.011 (1.56) 
Financial/regulatory characteristics 
  Legal origin 2.692a (2.62) −0.411 (−0.75) −1.068 (−1.60) 3.089c (2.42) 
  Business freedom 0.071 (1.31) −0.003 (−0.05) −0.057 (−0.96) −0.034 (−0.56) 
  Bank dominated 0.038 (1.38) 0.080a (3.19) 0.073a (2.99) −0.006 (−0.26) 
  US 10-year rate −1.257 (−1.29) −1.749b 
(−1.78) 
−1.531 (−1.61) −1.615b 
(−1.67) 
  Tax rate −0.012 (−0.20) −0.013 (−0.23) −0.062 (−1.12) −0.031 (−0.57) 
  GAAP 0.007 (0.33) 0.011 (0.50) −0.026 (−1.13) −0.027 (−1.24) 
General firm characteristics 
  Asset tangibility −0.049 (−1.16) −0.039 (−0.89) 0.006 (0.15) −0.030 (−0.73) 
  Total assets −0.000 (−0.73) −0.000 (−0.88) −0.000 (−1.11) −0.000 (−0.19) 
















  Lagged leverage 0.499a (14.37) 0.503a (14.35) 0.504a (15.10) 0.479a (13.71) 
REIT specific attributes 
  Secured debt 0.000 (1.53) 0.000 (1.49) 0.000 (1.50) 0.000c (2.38) 
  Rated debt −0.015 (−1.31) −0.015 (−1.32) −0.016 (−1.33) −0.022b 
(−1.93) 
  Split bond ratings −0.004 (−0.21) −0.001 (−0.07) −0.019 (−0.93) −0.009 (−0.49) 








  Repurchases −0.015 (−0.48) −0.024 (−0.80) −0.029 (−0.83) −0.021 (−0.63) 
  Operating leverage 0.001 (1.07) 0.002 (1.22) 0.001 (0.86) 0.002 (1.25) 
  Lease payments −1.723 (−0.94) −1.800 (−0.97) −2.237 (−1.16) −1.681 (−0.90) 
  Total countries 0.005b (1.88) 0.006c (2.26) 0.005c (2.04) 0.003 (1.17) 
  Development 0.010 (1.02) 0.010 (0.99) 0.020b (1.90) 0.021b (1.94) 
Observations 1,066 1,066 1,066 1,066 
R-squared 0.699 0.697 0.697 0.707 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’ 
use of leverage. The first three models regresses the firm’s Market Leverage against our three measures of 
political risk separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry 
level variables. In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, 
while Model (3) employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The t-tests 
reported in parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm 
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
bIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level 
cIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level 
In sum, the findings of Table 5 clearly suggest that REITs and listed property companies take 
on more leverage when their investment properties are located in countries characterized by 
less political risk and uncertainty. Thus, political risk appears to be an important dimension of 
capital structure decision making for real estate firms within this region as firms strategically 
respond to the increased bankruptcy costs associated with enhanced political risk exposure by 
assuming less leverage. 
While Table 5 examines the impact of political risk on market leverage, Table 6 replicates the 
analysis examining book leverage. As in Table 5, we again find that political risk is significantly 
related to firm capital structure.22 Consistent with expectations, Asian-Pacific real estate firms 
facing more political risk exposure use less leverage. Specifically, we find that as the 
functionality of the political system increases, as disruptive political changes become less 
likely, and as profits are easier to repatriate, real estate firms take on more leverage. In sum, 
the relation between political risk and firm leverage appears to be robust to the selection of 
book versus market leverage metrics. 
Table 6 Determinants of book leverage for Asia-Pacific real estate companies 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Intercept 0.005 (0.07) −0.045 (−0.71) 0.039 (0.60) 0.026 (0.44) 
Political risk variables 
  Political rights index −3.475a 
(−5.13) 
    −3.085a 
(−3.53) 
  Political change index   0.274a (4.60)   0.096 (1.15) 
  R-Factor     0.059 (1.49) 0.117a (3.39) 
Similarity measures 








  Procedures required to register 
property 
−0.001 (−0.01) 0.008 (0.12) 0.048 (0.67) −0.016 (−0.24) 
  Market cap / GDP −0.000 (−0.05) −0.000 (−1.28) −0.000 (−0.69) −0.000 (−0.20) 
  Broadband per 100 0.010 (0.72) 0.023c (1.70) 0.004 (0.29) 0.014 (0.94) 
  % of GDP spent on primary education 0.002 (0.20) 0.011 (1.38) 0.002 (0.24) −0.000 (−0.05) 
  Female participation in labor force 0.009 (1.43) 0.006 (1.09) 0.011c (1.79) 0.007 (1.07) 
Financial/regulatory characteristics 
  Legal origin 3.908a (3.89) −0.624 (−1.18) −0.662 (−1.00) 2.384c (1.93) 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
  Business freedom 0.097c (1.77) −0.017 (−0.31) −0.003 (−0.05) −0.021 (−0.37) 
  Bank dominated 0.041c (1.93) 0.099a (5.27) 0.102a (4.38) 0.033c (1.67) 
  US 10-yr rate 1.064 (1.15) 0.231 (0.26) 0.976 (0.94) 0.422 (0.46) 
  Tax rate −0.076 (−1.25) −0.071 (−1.24) −0.131b 
(−2.18) 
−0.082 (−1.46) 
  GAAP 0.005 (0.36) 0.014 (0.84) −0.021 (−1.18) −0.011 (−0.68) 
General firm characteristics 
  Asset tangibility −0.036 (−1.02) −0.027 (−0.73) 0.024 (0.65) −0.024 (−0.68) 
  Total assets 0.000 (0.39) 0.000 (0.29) −0.000 (−0.57) 0.000 (0.76) 








  Growth options 0.031c (1.84) 0.036b (2.24) 0.036c (1.91) 0.032b (1.98) 
  Lagged leverage 0.403a (12.10) 0.407a (12.21) 0.420a (13.21) 0.390a (11.74) 
REIT specific attributes 
  Secured debt −0.000 (−0.02) −0.000 (−0.04) −0.000 (−0.40) 0.000 (0.70) 
  Rated debt −0.006 (−0.58) −0.008 (−0.72) −0.004 (−0.31) −0.012 (−1.14) 
  Split bond ratings 0.008 (0.47) 0.015 (0.86) −0.009 (−0.45) 0.009 (0.48) 
  Asset age 0.001 (0.24) −0.001 (−0.35) 0.000 (0.20) −0.000 (−0.15) 
  Repurchases −0.008 (−0.23) −0.022 (−0.65) −0.022 (−0.64) −0.018 (−0.50) 
  Operating leverage −0.001 (−0.45) −0.000 (−0.10) −0.001 (−0.78) −0.000 (−0.12) 
  Lease payments −0.586 (−0.32) −0.615 (−0.32) −1.265 (−0.64) −0.510 (−0.26) 
  Total countries 0.006b (2.36) 0.008a (2.96) 0.007a (2.72) 0.006b (2.12) 
  Development 0.007 (0.75) 0.006 (0.61) 0.014 (1.38) 0.013 (1.30) 
Observations 1,066 1,066 1,066 1,066 
R-Squared 0.602 0.603 0.579 0.612 
Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’ 
use of leverage. The first three models regresses the firm’s Book Leverage against our three measures of political 
risk separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level 
variables. In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while 
Model (3) employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The t-tests reported in 
parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm 
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level 
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level 
 
Robustness 
High Versus Low Market-to-Book REITs 
Billet et al. (2007) find evidence that leverage relations differ systematically between high and 
low market-to-book value firms. Therefore, we next split our sample between high and low 
market-to-book Asia-Pacific real estate firms, re-estimate our base model specifications on 
these subsamples, and report the results in Table 7. Panel A presents the results of our 
analysis examining the low market-to-book tercile. The results remain consistent with our full 
sample findings. Specifically, as the functionality of the political process in the countries where 
the REIT or listed property trust holds investment properties are located increases, and as 
organizational cash flows become easier to repatriate back to the home country, firms employ 
more leverage. 
Table 7 Determinants of leverage by high versus low market-to-book value ratios for Asia-Pacific real 
estate companies 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Panel A: market leverage, lowest MTB tercile 
Intercept 0.370a (2.47) 0.299a (2.06) 0.310a (2.07) 0.387b (2.67) 
Political rights index −4.739b (−3.32)     −4.807a (−2.44) 
Political change index   0.384b (3.83)   0.095 (0.59) 
R-Factor     0.152c (1.66) 0.243b (3.10) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 
R-Squared 0.747 0.746 0.730 0.760 
Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: market leverage, highest MTB tercile 
Intercept 0.226b (3.19) 0.216b (2.95) 0.287b (3.73) 0.322b (4.39) 
Political rights index −2.252c (−1.98)     −4.919b (−2.93) 
Political change index   0.102 (1.12)   −0.132 (−1.01) 
R-Factor     0.075 (1.41) 0.159b (3.03) 
Observations 345 345 345 345 
R-Squared 0.642 0.638 0.639 0.653 
Property Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’ 
use of leverage. Each model regresses the firm’s Leverage ratio against the three measures of political risk 
separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level variables. 
In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while Model (3) 
employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. Panel A reflects an analysis of 
the lowest tercile of MTB firms, while Panel B reports results for the highest tercile. The t-tests reported in 
parenthesis are all based on standard errors clustered by firm 
aIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level 
bIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level 
Similarly, Panel B presents the results of our analysis for the high market-to-book tercile. Once 
again, we find results that are qualitatively consistent with our a priori expectations. While not 
as statistically robust, Political Rights and R-Factor both remain consistent with our full sample 
findings, and again suggest that as a real estate firm’s political risk exposure increases the 
company employs less leverage. 
Security Issuance Decisions 
Finally, we also examine the sub-sample of firms that issue securities, as these firms are 
actively accessing the capital market and thereby consciously making a capital structure 
decision. Table 8 presents the results of this analysis. Once again, within this more restrictive 
and conceptually relevant subsample, we generally find that as political risk exposure 
increases Asia-Pacific real estate firms employ less leverage. Political Rights, Political 
Change, and R-Factor all tend to be both directionally and statistically consistent with our full 
sample findings, again implying that as political risk exposure increases, REITs and listed 
property trusts take on less leverage.23 Taken together, the results presented in Tables 7 and 8 
suggest our results are robust to different sub-sample analyses, and are not an artificial 
construct based upon the idiosyncrasies of a particular sampling methodology. 
Table 8 Determinants of leverage for security issuing Asia-Pacific real estate companies 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Intercept 0.374a (4.11) 0.351a (3.93) 0.457a (4.41) 0.441a (4.67) 
Political rights index −2.360b (−2.14)     −3.112b (−2.09) 
Political change index   0.174c (1.81)   −0.025 (−0.18) 
R-Factor     0.106 (1.65) 0.142b (2.14) 
Observations 460 460 460 460 
R-Squared 0.689 0.689 0.687 0.694 
Property type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of four regressions investigating the determinants of Asia-Pacific real estate firms’ 
use of leverage. Each model regresses the firm’s Leverage ratio against the three measures of political risk 
separately, while controlling for the financial and regulatory standards, as well as firm and industry level variables. 
In Model (1), the Political Rights Index is used. In Model (2) the Political Change Index is utilized, while Model (3) 
employs the R-Factor. Model (4) includes all three of our political risk measures. The sample is restricted to only 
firms that raised capital in the secondary market during a given year. The t-tests reported in parenthesis are all 
based on standard errors clustered by firm 
aIndicates statistical significance at 1 % level 
bIndicates statistical significance at 5 % level 
cIndicates statistical significance at 10 % level 
Summary and Conclusions 
As financial markets become increasingly integrated, researchers must investigate and 
understand how cross-border considerations influence firm decision making. Along this line of 
inquiry, we examine how jurisdictional differences in the countries that Asia-Pacific REITs hold 
investment properties in impact the firm’s debt capacity. In general, we find that for real estate 
firms holding real estate investments across international boundaries, leverage is not just a 
function of financial risk, but also the political risk associated with the properties in which the 
firm invests. More specifically, after controlling for both traditional and REIT specific 
determinants of firm leverage, we find that as 1) the efficiency of government functioning 
increases, 2) the probability or expected financial impact of political turmoil decreases, and 3) 
the ability to repatriate cash flows back to the home country of the firm increases, real estate 
firms employ more debt. These results hold regardless of whether debt is measured in terms of 
either book or market leverage, and are robust to alternative estimation subsamples including 
market-to-book value terciles and subsamples of only capital raising firms. Taken together, 
these results provide strong evidence that political risk exerts significance influence over the 
capital structure decisions of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts. 
Footnotes 
1 While one could easily foresee such constraints manifesting themselves in the form of performance 
differentials across firms, that does not have to be the case. More specifically, limited access to 
capital may also serve to mitigate potential diseconomies of scale and/or agency problems 
related to managerial empire building. 
2 Burgman (1996) measures political risk as the ratio of the Euromoney 20 safest countries invested in 
to total countries invested in. 
3 Similarly, Deng et al. (2013) argue organizational form and operational transparency are inextricably 
related. To the extent political risk influences a firm’s optimal organizational structure, it could 
easily result in observable differences in firm transparency and/or performance. 
4 The theoretical foundations of trade-off theory date back to the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963). For a broad overview of alternative capital structure theories, see Harris and 
Raviv (1991). They not only discuss trade-off theory, but also leverage models based upon 
agency costs, corporate control considerations, and product/input market interactions. 
5 Specifically, Lou (2008) and Tan (2009) report Australian and Singapore REITs are generally 
exempt from REIT level taxation, while Japanese REITs are subject to tax, but their distributions 
are often deductible. In South Korea, general REITs are subject to regular income tax 
provisions, however corporate restructuring REITs (CR-REITs) are exempt provided the 
minimum 90 % distribution requirements are met. Hong Kong REITs also enjoy tax advantages 
as they do not face withholding taxes, capital gains taxes, or income taxes on earnings 
generated from overseas operations. 
6 For further discussion and insight into the limitations of applying trade-off theory to REIT markets, see 
Howe and Shilling (1988) 
7 See, for example, Feng et al. (2007), Boudry et al. (2010), and Harrison et al. (2011). 
8 Interestingly, while conventional wisdom amongst both academics and real estate industry 
practitioners holds that REITs are effectively capital constrained in the sense they cannot retain 
large shares of annual operating profits, Wang et al. (1993) and Bradley et al. (1998) both 
report average REIT dividend payout ratios well in excess of 100 % of taxable income. Given 
the large depreciation and amortization allowances real property investments often provide, 
cash flow (and funds from operations) frequently exceeds reported taxable income by vast 
amounts. To the extent this phenomenon holds within the Asia-Pacific market, concerns over 
the applicability of pecking-order theory may be overblown. 
9 Empirical and anecdotal support for the market timing hypothesis within non-REIT firms may be found 
in Graham and Harvey (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
10 Additional studies suggesting a positive relation between firm size and leverage ratios include Maris 
and Elayan (1990), Jaffe (1991), Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and 
Barclay et al. (2006). 
11 Consistent with this reasoning, Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and French (2002), and Barclay 
et al. (2006), among others, all document a negative relation between firm profitability and 
leverage. 
12 While the preponderance of the evidence seems to suggest a negative relation between growth 
options and firm leverage, the findings are not unanimous in this conclusion. For example, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) fail to find statistically significant evidence, either positive or 
negative, of a relation between growth options and leverage. Similarly, Feng et al. (2007) 
present evidence suggesting these relations within their REIT market sample appear to be 
context specific with some model specifications resulting in positive observed relations between 
growth options and leverage, while other specifications come to exactly the opposite conclusion. 
13 Faulkender and Petersen (2006) arrive at similar conclusions for non-REIT firms. 
14 See, for example, Livingston et al. (2007) and Helwege and Liang (1996). 
15 Credit rationing, in this context, can take the form of either volume or price restrictions. Volume 
restrictions, by definition, will reduce observed debt ratios. Similarly, price adjustments will drive 
borrowing costs up, leaving fewer firms ready, willing, and able to profitably deploy the borrowed 
funds. Thus, regardless of the nature of the credit rationing, lower debt ratios are expected to 
prevail. 
16 Note, of the 187 sample firms, 119 hold investment properties located exclusively within a single 
country and hence have index values which correspond directly to that country’s Political Rights 
Index, Political Change Index, and R-Factor. For the remaining 68 firms holding assets across 
multiple jurisdictions, we weight location specific index values for our Political Rights Index, 
Political Change Index, and R-Factor metrics by the fraction of each firm’s investment portfolio 
located within each specific country. These property weighted averages are each designed to 
capture alternative dimensions of political risk, and taken together should provide unique insight 
into the influence of political risk on firm capital structure decisions. 
17 We readily acknowledge that to the extent restrictive economic environments erect artificial barriers 
to entry for new firms, existing firms may be insulated from competitive market pressures, enjoy 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market power, and thus exhibit an enhanced debt capacity. 
18 A broad literature exists addressing the dynamics and differences between bank dominated and 
market dominated economic systems. For further details, discussion, and analysis of these 
issues, see Allen and Gale (2001), Levine (2002), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999, 2004), 
and Chakraborty and Ray (2006). 
19 For the purposes of the current investigation, in the spirit of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999, 
2004), we define an economic system as being bank dominated if the ratio of domestic assets 
of deposit money banks to market capitalization is less than 1.10. Alternative proxies using 
differential cut-off values, or employing classifications provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1999, 2004), produce virtually identical results. 
20 See, for example, Senbet (1979) for further discussion of the role of international tax differentials on 
the optimal capital structure of the firm. 
21 All significance tests presented in the multivariate analysis are based on standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. Additionally, we note that we do not include year and country fixed effects, as 
these are perfectly correlated with several of our control variables. However, in unreported tests 
where we remove these controls and include fixed effects we find qualitatively similar results. 
See Petersen (2009) for further discussion of these issues. 
22 Additionally, we note that in unreported tests splitting the sample between firms that invest in a 
single country and those that invest across multiple countries we find qualitatively similar results 
for our Political Risk metrics. 
23 We observe similar, but somewhat less statistically significant results when we split the sample 
between debt and equity issuers. 
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Appendix 
Political Rights Index  This is the property weighted average of the Freedom of the World Political 
Rights Index. Higher values indicate a government that is less functional. 
Political Change Index  This is the property weighted average of the Business Risk Service Political 
Risk Index. Higher values indicate that political change which will materially 
affect business is less likely. 
R-Factor  This is the property weighted average of the Business Risk Service 
remittances and repatriation of capital factor. Higher values indicate that it is 
relatively easy to repatriate profits. 
Time to Export  This is the property weighted average of the minimum time it takes (in days) 
to export products from a country, as reported by the World Bank. 
Procedures required to 
register property  
This is the property weighted average of the minimum number of procedures 
required for a business to secure rights to a property, as reported by the 
World Bank. 
Market Cap / GDP  This is the property weighted average of the ratio of the equity market 
capitalization of domestic firms to a country’s GDP, as reported by the World 
Bank. 
Broadband per 100  This is the property weighted average of the number of broadband 
subscribes per 100 people, as reported by the World Bank. 
% of GDP spent on 
primary education  
This is the property weighted average of the percent of GDP spent per 
student on primary school education, as reported by the World Bank. 
Female participation in 
labor force  
This is the property weighted average of the proportion of females who 
actively participate in the work force, as reported by the World Bank. 
Legal Origin  This is the percent of the real estate company’s properties that are located in 
countries where the legal system is based on Civil Law foundations. 
Business Freedom  This is the property weighted average of the Heritage Foundation’s Business 
Freedom Index. 
Bank Dominated  This is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the ratio of domestic 
assets of deposit money banks to total equity market capitalization is less 
than 1.10. 
US 10-year Rate  This is the interest rate on the 10-year U.S. constant maturity Treasury note. 
Tax Rate  This is the highest corporate tax rate applicable in the country where the real 
estate company is headquartered. The Tax Rate is set to 0 for all REITs. 
GAAP  This is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm uses GAAP financial reporting 
standards; 0 if the firm employs IFRS. 
Asset Tangibility  Total Real Estate Operations / Total Assets. 
Total Assets  Total Assets reported in US dollars. 
Profitability  FFO / Total Assets. 
Growth Options  Market Capitalization / (Total Assets - Total Debt). 
Lagged Leverage  Lagged value of leverage. 
Secured Debt  Secured Debt / Total Debt. 
Rated Debt  This is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm has rated debt outstanding; 0 
otherwise. 
Split Bond Ratings  An indicator variable set to 1 if two or more rating agencies have different 
notch level long-term issuer credit ratings for the firm; 0 otherwise. 
Asset Age  Time since SNL first recorded the firm’s total assets. 
Repurchases  An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s shares outstanding declines by 
more than 2 % over a given year; 0 otherwise. 
Operating Leverage  The change in FFO / change in revenue: Windsorized. 
Lease Payments  The firm’s total committed capital lease obligations / Total Assets. 
Total Countries  The number of different countries in which the firm owns investment 
properties. 
Development  An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm engages in investment property 
development, construction programs, or has an active property development 
pipeline; 0 otherwise. 
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